Blockchain protocols achieve consistency by instructing parties to remove a su x of a certain length from their local blockchain. The current state of the art in Proof of Stake (PoS) blockchain protocols, exempli ed by Ouroboros (Crypto 2017), Ouroboros Praos (Eurocrypt 2018) and Sleepy Consensus (Asiacrypt 2017) suggests that the length of the segment should be Θ( 2 ) for the consistency error to be exponentially decreasing in . This is in contrast with Proof of Work (PoW) based blockchains for which it is known that a su x of length Θ( ) is su cient for the same type of exponentially decreasing consistency error. This quadratic gap in consistency guarantee is quite signi cant as the length of the su x is a lower bound for the time required to wait for transactions to settle. Whether this is an intrinsic limitation of PoS-due to issues such as the "nothing-at-stake" problem-or it can be improved is an open question. In this work we put forth a novel and general probabilistic analysis for PoS consistency that improves the required su x length from Θ( 2 ) to Θ( ) thus showing, for the rst time, how PoS protocols can match PoW blockchain protocols for exponentially decreasing consistency error. Moreover, our detailed analysis provides an explicit polynomial-time algorithm for exactly computing the (exponentially-decaying) error function which can directly inform practice.
Introduction
The success of Bitcoin and, in general, usage of blockchains for supporting and archiving the results of consensus protocols has led to a concerted e ort to develop rigorous formal tools for reasoning about blockchain dynamics. These e orts were motivated both by the Bitcoin proof-of-work blockchain itself and the desire for alternative blockchain protocols that are organized around other resources (e.g., proof-of-space, proof-of-stake, etc.). In this article, we establish rigorous, quantitative bounds on the time necessary for transactions to settle for a broad family of blockchain protocols adopting the longest chain rule, notably including proof-of-stake blockchains such as Snow White [2] and the Ouroboros family [7, 3, 1] . The principal feature of our new analysis is that it applies to proof-of-stake based blockchain systems, which must contend with challenging adversarial behavior that does not exist in proof-of-work systems:
• Nothing at stake attacks. When an adversary has the right to extend a proof-of-stake blockchain, he may produce many di erent blocks that extend di erent chains of the system or, similarly, yield many di erent extensions of a particular longest chain-this corresponds to "nothing-at-stake" attacks that can permit an adversary to construct, on-the-y, competing blockchains at no cost; in contrast, the total number of blocks produced by a minority adversary in a proof-of-work based system is dominated by the number of blocks that are honestly produced.
• Known leader schedules. In some proof-of-stake based blockchains, (portions of) the future schedule of participants permitted to add to the chain is public. In contrast, the right to add a block in proof-of-work settings is determined in a stochastic online fashion that does not permit the adversary signi cant "lookahead".
We organize our general model around a simple family of blockchain axioms. The axioms themselves are easy to interpret and few in number. This permits us to abstract many features of the underlying blockchain protocol (e.g., the details of the leader-election process, the cryptographic security of the relevant signature schemes and hash functions, and randomness generation), while still establishing results that are strong enough to plug in to existing analyses. Our most interesting nding is a quite tight theory of blockchain settlement times that depends only on the schedule of participants certi ed to add a block. The theory builds on the combinatorial notion of a forkable string which plays a fundamental role in the security and functionality guarantees of the recent proof-of-stake protocols Ouroboros [7] , Ouroboros Praos [3] , and Ouroboros Genesis [1] . In particular, our techniques o er a signi cant improvement over the original analysis [7] , which established that the probability of a "depth-" settlement failure at time was no more than exp(−Ω( √ )). Our new techniques establish that the probability of a settlement failure at time is no more than exp(−Ω( )). Note that this is independent of , the position in the blockchain, and dramatically improves the scaling in the exponent from √ to . We remark that at the expense of weaker dependence on the power of the adversary, our techniques can also be applied to quite broad classes of schedule distributions. While we discuss this in detail later, we remark that this is important for applying our techniques to security proofs involving adaptive adversaries.
From a technical perspective, we contrast the structure of our proofs with existing techniques for the PoW case. The PoW results nd a direct connection between persistence and the behavior of a biased, one-dimensional random walk. Curiously, our results give a tight relationship between the PoS case and a pair of coupled biased random walks. A major challenge in the analysis is to bound the behavior of this richer stochastic process. Finally, we remark that our tools yield precise, explicit upper bounds on the probability of persistence violations that can be directly applied to tune the parameters of deployed PoS systems. See Section 7 where we record some concrete results of the general theory. The importance of these results in the practice of PoS blockchain systems cannot be understated: they provide, for the rst time, exact error bounds for settlement times for any PoS blockchain that follows longest chain rule.
Direct consequences.
Our results establish consistency bounds in a quite general setting-see below: In particular, they directly imply exp(− ( )) consistency for the Ouroboros [7] , Ouroboros Praos [3] , and Ouroboros Genesis [1] blockchain protocols. (The Ouroboros Praos and Ouroboros Genesis analyses in fact directly rely on this article for their settlement estimates.) Related work. Blockchain protocol analysis in the POW-setting was initiated in [4] and further improved in [14, 5] . The security bounds for consistency proven are linear in the security parameter. Sleepy consensus [11, Theorem 13 ] provides a consistency bound of the form exp(−Ω( √ )). Note that [11] is not a PoS protocol per-se but it is possible to turn it into one as was demonstrated in [2] . The analysis of the Ouroboros blockchain [7] achieved exp(−Ω( √ ). We remark that the analyses of Ouroboros Praos [3] and Ouroboros Genesis [1] developed signi cant new machinery for handling other challenges (e.g., adaptive adversaries, partial synchrony), but directly refered to a preliminary version of this paper to conclude their guarantees of exp(−Ω( )).
As we focus on the longest chain rule, our analysis is not applicable to protocols like Algorand [8] which, in fact, o er settlement in expected constant time without invoking blockchain reorganisation or forks; however, Algorand lacks the ability to operate in the "sleepy" [11] or "dynamic availability" [1] setting (which permits an evolving population of participants). In our combinatorial analysis, a synchronous mode of operation is assumed against a rushing adversary; this is without loss of generality vis-a-vis the result of [3] where it was shown how to reduce the combinatorial analysis in the partially synchronous setting to the synchronous one. We note that a number of works have shown how to use a blockchain protocol to bootstrap a cryptographic protocol that can o er faster settlement time under stronger assumptions than honest majority, e.g., Hybrid Consensus [12] or Thunderella [13] ; our results are orthogonal and synergistic to those since they can be used to improve the settlement time bounds of the blockchain protocol that operates as a fallback mechanism.
Outline. We begin in Section 2 by describing a simple general model for blockchain dynamics. Section 3 builds on this to set down a number of basic de nitions required for the proofs. The rst part of the proof is described in Section 4, which develops a "relative" version of the theory of margin from [7] ; most details are then relegated to Section 6 in order to move quickly to the settlement estimates. We then provide two di erent settlement estimates in Section 5; roughly, the two bounds trade o generality with the strength of the nal estimates. Finally, in Section 7 we compute exact settlement probabilities for a variety of values of .
The blockchain axioms and the settlement security model
Typical blockchain consensus protocols call for each participant to maintain a blockchain; this is a data structure that organizes transactions and other protocol metadata into an ordered historical record of "blocks". A basic design goal of these systems is to guarantee that participants' blockchains always agree on a common pre x; the di ering su xes of these chains held by various participants roughly correspond to the possible future states of system. Thus the major analytic challenge is to ensure that-despite evolving adversarial control of some of the participants-the portion of honest participants' blockchains that might pairwise disagree is con ned to a short su x. This provides the fundamental guarantee of persistence for these algorithms which asserts that data appearing deep enough in the chain can be considered to be stable, or "settled."
We adopt a discrete notion of time organized into a sequence of slots {sl 0 , sl 1 , …} and assume all protocol participants have the luxury of synchronized clocks that report the current slot number. The protocols we consider rely on two critical algorithmic devices:
• A leader election mechanism, which randomly assigns to each time slot a set of "leaders" permitted to post a new block in that slot.
• The longest chain rule, which calls for the leader(s) of each slot to add a block to the end of the longest blockchain she has yet observed, and broadcast this new chain to other participants.
The Bitcoin protocol uses a proof-of-work mechanism to carry out leader election which is modeled using a random oracle, [4, 14, 5] ; proof-of-stake systems typically require more intricate leader election mechanisms. (For example, the Ouroboros protocol [7] uses a full MPC to distribute clean randomness, while Snow White [2] , Algorand [8] , and Ouroboros Praos [3] use hashing and a family of values determined on-the-y.) Despite these di erences all existing analyses show that the leader election mechanism suitably approximates an ideal distribution, which is also the approach we will adopt for our analysis. With this in hand, analyses of these protocols then study the properties of the blockchains that can arise via the longest chain rule-this second stage of the analysis will be our primary focus.
The blockchain axioms and forks
To simplify our analysis, we assume a synchronous communication network in the presence of a rushing adversary: in particular, any message broadcast by an honest participant at the beginning of a particular slot is received by the adversary rst, who may decide strategically and individually for each recipient in the network whether to inject additional messages and in what order all messages are to be delivered prior to the conclusion of the slot.
(See §2.3 below for comments on this network assumption.) Given this, the behavior of the protocol when carried out by a group of honest participants (who follow the protocol) in the presence of an adversary is clear. Assuming that the system is initialized with a common "genesis block" corresponding to sl 0 and the leader election process in fact elects a single leader per slot, each participant's state is a linearly growing blockchain:
(It is worth noting that even when all the participants are honest, it is possible for a network adversary to induce divergent views between the players by taking advantage of possible slots where more than a single honest participant wins the leader election.)
The blockchain axioms. The introduction of adversarial participants further complicates the family of possible blockchains that could emerge from this process. To explore this in the context of our protocols, we work with an abstract notion of blockchain, which ignores all internal structure: Speci cally, we treat a blockchain as a sequence of abstract blocks, each labeled with a slot number, so that:
A1. The blockchain begins with a xed "genesis" block, assigned to slot sl 0 .
A2. The (slot) labels of the blocks are in strictly increasing order.
Thus we model a "blockchain" as a labeled, directed graph which represents each block with a vertex; speci cally, a blockchain is a path beginning with a special "genesis" vertex, labeled 0, followed by vertices with strictly increasing labels which indicate which slot is associated with the block. (See the example below.)
A basic property of the actual blockchains created by such algorithms is that they are immutable in the sense that any block in the chain in fact commits to the entire previous history of the chain; in particular, it contains a cryptographic hash of the previous block. Additionally, a proof mechanism should be used to ensure that any block labeled with slot sl was indeed produced by an elected leader of slot sl . Of course, an immediate property of the protocol above is that an honest player will add a single block (to a single previous chain in its local state) during any slot. In particular:
A3. If a slot sl was assigned to a single honest player, then a single block is created-during the entire protocolwith the label sl .
In particular, these properties imply that any blockchain produced during the protocol that includes a block in a slot sl assigned to a unique honest player must contain (as a pre x) the unique blockchain broadcast by that player during sl . As we analyze the dynamics of blockchain algorithms, it is convenient to maintain an entire family of blockchains at once. As a matter of bookkeeping, when two blockchains agree on a common pre x, we can glue together the associated paths to re ect this, as indicated below. When we glue together many chains to form such a diagram, we call it a "fork"-the precise de nition appears below. Observe that while these two blockchains agree through the vertex (block) labeled 5, they contain (distinct) vertices labeled 9; this re ects two distinct blocks associated with slot 9. Finally, in light of the fact that messages from honest players are delivered immediately, we note a direct consequence of the longest chain rule: A4. If two honestly generated blocks 1 and 2 are labeled with slots sl 1 and sl 2 for which sl 1 < sl 2 , then the length of the unique blockchain terminating at 1 is strictly less than the length of the unique blockchain terminating at 2 .
(In particular, note that the honest participant assigned to slot sl 2 will be aware of the blockchain terminating at 1 that was broadcast by the honest player in slot sl 1 ; according to the longest chain rule, it must have placed 2 on a chain that was at least this long.) Characteristic strings. Note that with the axioms we have set down above, whether or not a particular fork diagram (such as the one just above) can be realized depends on how the slots have been awarded to the parties by the leader election mechanism. To re ect this information, we introduce the notion of a "characteristic" string. With this discussion behind us, we set down the formal object we use to re ect the various blockchains broadcast by honest players during the execution of a blockchain protocol. 
De nition 1 (Characteristic string

Adversarial attacks on settlement time; the settlement game.
We are now in a situation to explore the power of an adversary in this setting who has control of a xed fraction < 1∕2 of the participants of the protocol. The most pressing question is whether the adversary can produce two signi cantly diverging blockchains, both having the maximal length among all blockchains broadcast by the system at some slot sl . Note that in such a case the adversary has produced two alternate views of history that each look equally valid to an honest participant viewing the protocol at sl ; furthermore, if these chains diverge at (the earlier) sl , it is clear that we cannot treat any block associated with slots sl +1 , … , sl as "settled".
To explicitly study settlement, we consider the ( , ; , )-settlement game, played between an adversary and a challenger with a leader election mechanism modeled by ; intuitively, the game should re ect the ability of the adversary to produce two blockchains that diverge prior to slot sl and both chains have the maximal length among all chains produced by the protocol at some (later) time > + . The challenger plays the role(s) of the honest players during the protocol. We say that wins the settlement game if, for some ≥ + , there are two paths in the fork where both paths (i.) have the maximal length among all paths in the fork, and (ii.) "diverge prior to sl "-speci cally, they either contain di erent vertices labeled with or one contains a vertex labeled and the other does not. Remarks. A few remarks are in order about the settlement game: First of all, observe that the behavior of the challenger in the game is entirely deterministic, as it simply plays according to the longest chain rule (even permitting the adversary to break ties). Thus the result of the game is entirely determined by the characteristic string drawn from and the choices of the adversary. We record the following immediate conclusion:
De nition 3. Let be a distribution on
there exists a pre x̂ of of length at least + and a fork ⊢̂ with two maximal length paths that diverge prior to slot
where the string is drawn from the distribution .
In the next section, we will develop some further notation and tools to analyse this event. In any case, we can state our main theorem.
Theorem 1 (Main theorem)
. Let ℬ be the binomial distribution ( , (1 − )∕2); speci cally, a string ∈ {0, 1} drawn from ℬ has the property that each bit is independent and Pr[ = 1] = (1 − )∕2. Then More generally, let be a distribution so that when ∈ {0, 1} is drawn according to , for each ,
(Here the asymptotic notation hides constants that do not depend on or .)
Additionally, we provide a polynomial time algorithm (in ) for computing an explicit upper bound on these probabilities (cf. Section 7).
Comments on the model
Network synchrony. The model above assumes a synchronous network with immediate delivery. In fact, the model can be easily adapted to the ∆-synchronous model adopted by the Snow White and Ouroboros Praos protocols and analyses. In particular, David et al. [3] developed a "∆-reduction" mapping on the space of characteristic strings that permits analyses of forks (and the related statistics of interest, cf. §3) in the ∆-synchronous setting by direct appeal to the synchronous setting.
Public leader schedules. One attractive feature of this model is that it gives the adversary full information about the future schedule of leaders. The analysis of some protocols indeed demand this (e.g., Ouroboros, Snow White). Other protocols-especially those designed to o er security against adaptive adversaries (Praos, Genesis)-in fact contrive to keep the leader schedule private. Of course, as our analysis is in the more di cult "full information" model, it applies to all of these systems.
De nitions
We rely on the elementary framework of forks and margin from Kiayias et al. [7] . We restate and brie y discuss the pertinent de nitions below. With these basic notions behind us, we then de ne a new "relative" notion of margin, which will allow us to signi cantly improve the e cacy of these tools for reasoning about settlement times. In particular, these tools will allow us to reason about the possibility that an adversary can produce two alternate histories of the blockchain that diverge prior to a particular block.
Recall that for a given execution of the protocol, we record the result of the leader election process via a characteristic string: ∈ {0, 1} is de ned so that = 0 when a unique and honest party is assigned to slot ; otherwise, = 1.
De nition 4 (Tines, length and height). Let ⊢ be a fork for a characteristic string. A tine of is a directed path starting from the root. For any tine we de ne its length to be the number of edges in the path, and for any vertex we de ne its depth to be the length of the unique tine that ends at . The height of a fork (as usual for a tree) is the length of the longest tine, denoted height( ). A vertex of a fork is said to be honest if it is labeled with an honest index of .
De nition 5 (The ∼ relations). The basic structure we use to use to reason about settlement times is that of a "balanced fork". Balanced forks and settlement time. A fundamental question arising naturally in typical blockchain settings is that of settlement time: speci cally, settlement time is the delay after which a transaction appearing in a particular block of a blockchain can be considered stable. The existence of a balanced fork is a precise indicator for "settlement violations" in this sense. Speci cally, consider a characteristic string and a transaction appearing in a block associated with the rst slot of (that is, slot + 1). In order to violate the stability at this point of the execution, the adversary must arrange for two chains-each of maximum length-which diverge prior to ; in particular, this indicates that there is an -balanced fork for . Observe now that to provide a rigorous -slot settlement guarantee-which is to say that the transaction can be considered settled once slots have gone by-it su ces to show that with overwhelming probability in choice of the characteristic string determined by the leader election process (of a full execution of the protocol), no such forks are possible. Speci cally, if the protocol runs for a total of time steps yielding the characteristics string = (where ∈ {0, 1} and the transaction of interest appears in slot + 1 as above) then it su ces to ensure that there is no -balanced fork for ̂ , wherê is a pre x of of length at least . Note that for systems adopting the longest chain this condition must necessarily involve the entire future dynamics of the blockchain. We remark that our analysis below will in fact let us take = ∞.
De nition 6 (Balanced fork). A fork is balanced if it contains a pair of tines
De nition 7 (Closed fork). A fork is closed if every leaf is honest. For convenience, we say the trivial fork is closed.
The next few de nitions are the start of a general toolkit for reasoning about an adversary's capacity to build highly diverging paths in forks based on the underlying characteristic string.
De nition 8 (Gap, reserve, and reach). For a closed fork ⊢ and its unique longest tinê , we de ne the gap of a tine to be gap( ) = length(̂ ) − length( ) .
Furthermore, we de ne the reserve of , denoted reserve( ), to be the number of adversarial indices in that appear after the terminating vertex of . More precisely, if is the last vertex of , then
These quantities together de ne the reach of a tine:
The notion of reach can be intuitively understood as a measurement of the resources available to our adversary. A large, negative value for reach corresponds to a tine that has fallen too far behind to be useful to the adversary, while a tine with nonnegative reach could be extended using a sequence of dishonest blocks until it is as long as (or longer than) the longest tine. Such a tine could be o ered to an honest player who would prefer it over, e.g., the currently longest tine in the fork.
De nition 9 (Maximum reach). For a closed fork ⊢ , we de ne ( ) to be the largest reach attained by any tine of , i.e., ( ) = max reach( ) . 
Note that reach( ) is never negative (as the longest tine of any fork always has reach at least 0). We overload this notation to denote the maximum reach of a given characteristic string:
( ) = max ⊢ closed max reach( ) .
De nition 10 (Margin
( ) = max 1 ≁ 2 min{reach( 1 ), reach( 2 )} .
Note that ( ) = ( ).
For convenience, we once again overload this notation to denote the margin of a string. ( ) refers to the maximum value of ( ) over all possible closed forks for a characteristic string :
Likewise, if =
for two strings and we de ne
It is not immediately obvious that margin is an interesting quantity; however, because our adversary is attempting to make two entirely disjoint tines of maximum length, it turns out to be a critical indicator. Previous work showed that a balanced fork can be constructed for a given characteristic string if and only if there exists some closed ⊢ such that ( ) ≥ 0 [7] . We record a relative version of this theorem below. Proof. The proof is immediate from the de nitions. We sketch the details for completeness. Suppose is an -balanced fork for . Then must contain a pair of tines 1 and 2 for which 1 ≁ 2 and length( 1 ) = length( 2 ) = height( ). This implies that gap( ) = 0, and reserve is always a nonnegative quantity, so reach( ) ≥ 0. Because 1 and 2 are edge-disjoint over and min{reach( 1 ), reach( 2 )} ≥ 0, we conclude that ( ) ≥ 0, as desired. Suppose ( ) ≥ 0. Then there is some closed fork for such that ( ) ≥ 0. By the de nition of relative margin, we know that has two tines 1 and 2 such that 1 ≁ 2 and reach( ) ≥ 0. Recall that we de ne reach by reach( ) = reserve( ) − gap( ), and so it follows in this case that reserve( ) − gap( ) ≥ 0. Therefore, we can build an -balanced fork by appending a path of gap( ) adversarial vertices from our reserve to each .
An important consequence of Fact 1 (in light of Lemma 1) is that we can formulate the success probability of the settlement game directly in terms of margin. 
Lemma 2. Let be a distribution on
A simple recursive formulation of relative margin
A signi cant nding of Kiayias et al. [7] is that the margin of a characteristic string ( )-the maximum value of a quantity taken over a (typically) exponentially-large family of forks-can be given a simple, mutually recursive formulation with the associated quantity of reach ( ). Speci cally, they prove the following lemma. We prove an analogous recursive statement for relative margin, recorded below.
Lemma 4 (Relative margin)
. Given a xed string ∈ {0, 1}*, ( ) = ( ) and, for all nonempty strings = ∈ {0, 1}*, ( 1) = ( ) + 1 , and
Additionally, there exists a closed fork ⊢ such that ( ) = ( ) and ( ) = ( ).
We delay the full proof of Lemma 4 to Section 6, preferring to immediately focus on the application to settlement times.
Discussion. The proof of Lemma 4 shares many technical similarities with the proof of Lemma 3 given by Kiayias et al. [7] . However, there is an important respect in which the proofs di er. Each of the proofs require de nition of a particular adversary (which, in e ect, constructs a fork achieving the worst case reach and margin guaranteed by the lemma). The adversary constructed by [7] can create a balanced fork for whenever ( ) ≥ 0 (i.e., is "forkable"). However, the adversary only focuses on the problem of producing disjoint tines over the entire string (consistent with the de nition of (⋅)). The "relative adversary," developed during the proof of Lemma 4, uses a more sophisticated rule for extending chains (tines) of the fork, which allows it to simultaneously maximize relative margin over all pre xes of the string. This remarkable property is important for the settlement proof below.
General settlement guarantees
With the recursive formulation from the previous section in hand, we are prepared to study the stochastic process that arises when the characteristic string is chosen from the binomial distribution. As mentioned in the introduction, we additionally study ( ) when these random variables are drawn from more general distributions-see below. For clarity, this section is organized around two di erent proofs of the following theorem which states the main result in a more qualitative fashion. The proofs themselves will yield the various concrete versions of the main theorem (Theorem 1) advertised in §2.
Theorem 2. Let ∈ {0, 1} and ∈ {0, 1} be independent random variables, each chosen according to the probability law that independently assigns each coordinate to the value 1 with probability (1 − )∕2 for > 0. Then
Remarks. Note that the nal bound does not depend on -indeed, the reach of a binomially distributed string ∈ {0, 1} converges to a xed exponential distribution (as → ∞) which stochastically dominates the other distributions of interest-this is discussed in detail below. We note the following corollary. We note another corollary (obtained by setting = 0 above), as it signi cantly strengthens the bound of exp(−Ω( √ )) obtained in [7] .
Corollary 2 (cf. [7] ). Let ∈ {0, 1} be chosen randomly according to the probability law that independently assigns each coordinate to the value 1 with probability (1 − )∕2 for > 0. We say that string is forkable if ( ) ≥ 0. Then
The proofs. We prove two quantitative versions of Theorem 2, which each establish a part of Theorem 1. The rst bound follows from analysis of a simple related martingale and has the advantage that it applies to a more general class of probability distributions for characteristic strings. (In particular, the martingale-based proof can handle characteristic strings that are themselves drawn from a martingale; we remark that there are settings where this exibility is important [1] .) The second bound requires binomially-distributed variables, but establishes a stronger estimate.
It is useful to give a name to this broader family of distributions we will consider.
De nition 11 ( -martingale condition).
We say that a sequence of random variables 1 , … , ∈ {0, 1} satisfy the -martingale condition if for each , Note that if the are binomially distributed-that is, independent and each with expectation (1 − )∕2-then they satisfy the -martingale condition with equality.
The two bounds we prove are the following. (where = and = ), Bound 1 immediately yields the "martingale" part of Theorem 1.
Bound 2. Let ∈ {0, 1} and ∈ {0, 1} be independent random variables, each chosen according to the probability law that independently assigns each coordinate to the value 1 with probability (1 − )∕2 for > 0. Then
Observe that by summing the probabilities
(where = and = ), Bound 2 immediately yields the "binomial" part of Theorem 1. In preparation for the proofs, we record the notion of stochastic dominance and study the distribution of ( ), where is a string drawn from the binomial distribution.
De nition 12 (Stochastic dominance). Let and be random variables taking values in ℝ. We say that stochastically dominates , written ⪯ if
Pr[ ≥ Λ] ≥ Pr[ ≥ Λ]
for every Λ ∈ ℝ. We extend this notion to probability distributions in the natural way. As a rule, we denote the probability distribution associated with a random variable using upper case script letters.
Observe that if ⪯ and is independent (of both and ) then + ⪯ + . 
Then ⪯ ∞ .
Remark. When the are binomially distributed (with parameter (1 − )∕2, as indicated above), the random variables actually converge to ∞ as → ∞; however, we will only require dominance for our proofs. In addition, let ℛ be the distribution associated with the random variable in the statement of Lemma 5. Then it follows that ℛ ⪯ ℛ ∞ . Since Proof of Lemma 5. Let 1 , … , denote random variables as described in the statement of the theorem. The proof constructs a sequence of binomially distributed random variables = ( 1 , … , ) ∈ {0, 1} (for which Pr[ = 1] = (1 − )∕2) and proceeds in two steps, rst establishing that ( ) ⪯ ( ) and then that ( ) ⪯ ∞ .
As a matter of notation, for any xed values 1 , … , ∈ {0, 1} , let and observe that the probability law of ( 1 , … , ) is precisely that of = ( 1 , … , ). For convenience, we simply identify the random variable with ( 1 , … , ) . Note that for any = ( 1 , … , ) and for each , the th coordinates of and satisfy ( ) ≤ ( ) (which is to say that ≤ ). It follows immediately that ( ( )) ≤ ( ( )) with probability 1 and hence that = ( ) ⪯ ( ).
To complete the proof, we now establish that ( ) ⪯ ∞ . We remark that the random variables ( ) (and ∞ ) have an immediate interpretation in terms of the Markov chain corresponding to a biased random walk on ℤ with a "re ecting boundary" at -1. Speci cally, consider the Markov chain on {0, 1, …} given by the transition diagram
where edges pointing right have probability (1 − )∕2 and edges pointing left-including the loop at 0-have probability (1 + )∕2. Examining the recursive description of ( ), it is easy to con rm that the random variable ( 1 , … , ) is precisely given by the result of evolving the Markov chain above for steps with all probability initially placed at 0. It is further easy to con rm that the distribution given by (4) above is stationary for this chain.
To establish stochastic dominance, it's convenient to work with the underlying distributions and consider walks of varying lengths: let ℛ ∶ ℤ → ℝ denote the probability distribution given by ( 1 , … , ) where the are binomial, as above; likewise de ne ℛ ∞ . For a distribution ℛ on ℤ, we de ne [ℛ] 0 to denote the probability distribution obtained by shifting all probability mass on negative numbers to zero; that is
for any distributions and on ℤ. It will also be convenient to introduce the shift operators: for a distribution ℛ ∶ ℤ → ℝ and an integer , we de ne ℛ to be the distribution given by the rule ℛ( ) = ℛ( − ). With these operators in place, we may write
with the understanding that ℛ 0 is the distribution placing unit probability at 0. The proof now proceeds by induction. It is clear that ℛ 0 ⪯ ℛ ∞ . Assuming that ℛ ⪯ ℛ ∞ , we note that for any ℛ ⪯ ℛ ∞ and, additionally, that
Finally, it is clear that stochastic dominance respects convex combinations, in the sense that if 1 ⪯ 1 and 2 ⪯ 2 then 1 + (1 − ) 2 ⪯ 1 + (1 − ) 2 (for 0 ≤ ≤ 1). We conclude that
as desired. Hence ( ) ⪯ ∞ , as desired.
Proof of Bound 1
The proof requires the following standard large deviation bound for supermartingales. The Φ will act as a "potential function" in the analysis: we will establish that Φ < 0 with high probability and, considering that ≤ + = Φ , this implies < 0, as desired. Let ∆ = Φ − Φ −1 ; we claim that-conditioned on any xed value ( , ) for ( , )-the random variable 
Lemma 5 implies that ℛ ⪯ ℛ ∞ . We reserve the symbol ( ) for the relative margin random walk which starts at a non-negative initial position . Thus ( ) = ( ) = , and
since the sequence ( Pr[
is non-decreasing and ℛ ⪯ ℛ ∞ . Fix a "large enough" positive integer * whose value will be assigned later in the analysis. Let us de ne the following events:
• Event : when ∈ [0, * ] and the ( ) walk is strictly positive on every pre x of with length at most ∕2; and • Event , : when ∈ [0, * ] and̂ is the smallest pre x of of length ∈ [ , ∕2] such that ( ) (̂ ) = 0. We say that̂ is a witnesses to the event , .
The right hand side of (7) can be written as where 0 = and the random variables are de ned at the outset of this proof for ≥ 1. We know that the ( ) walk starts with ( ) = ( ) = ≥ 0. Since holds, both the margin (̂ ) and the reach ( ̂ ) remain non-negative for all pre xeŝ of length = 1, 2, ⋯ , ∕2. These two facts imply that the random variable ≥ 0]. Now we are free to shift our focus from the relative margin walk to the sum of a martingale sequence.
For notational clarity, let us write ∶= ( * ) ∕2
. Since the sequence ( ) obeys the -martingale condition, is at most ∶= * − ∕2. Let us set * = 0 = ∕4. Then is at most − ∕4 and Azuma's inequality gives us
.
This is an upper bound on the second term in (8).
The third term in (8) concerns the event , and it can be bounded using our existing analysis of the = 0 case. Speci cally, suppose =̂ wherê is a witness to the event , . Since the ( ) walk remains nonnegative over the entire strinĝ , it follows that ( ̂ ) = ( ̂ ) = 0 and as a consequence, the ̂ walk on is identical to the walk on . Our analysis in the = 0 case suggests that Pr[ ( ) ≥ 0] is at most ( − , ) where = − and ( , ) is the bound in (5). Since (⋅, ) decreases monotonically in the rst argument, ( − , ) is at most ( ∕2, ). However, since the last quantity is independent of , the third term in (8) It is easy to check that the above quantity is at most 3 exp − 4 ∕(64 + 35 ) = 3 exp − 4 (1 − ( )) ∕64 .
Proof of Bound 2
Proof of Bound 2. Anticipating the proof, we make a few remarks about generating functions and stochastic dominance. We reserve the term generating function to refer to an "ordinary" generating function which represents a sequence 0 , 1 , … of non-negative real numbers by the formal power series ( ) = ∑ ∞
=0
. When (1) = ∑ = 1 we say that the generating function is a probability generating function; in this case, the generating function can naturally be associated with the integer-valued random variable for which Pr[ = ] = . If the probability generating functions and are associated with the random variables and , it is easy to check that ⋅ is the generating function associated with the convolution + (where and are assumed to be independent). Translating the notion of stochastic dominance to the setting with generating functions, we say that the generating function stochastically dominates if ∑ ≤ ≤ ∑ ≤ for all ≥ 0; we write ⪯ to denote this state of a airs. If 1 ⪯ 1 and 2 ⪯ 2 then 1 ⋅ 2 ⪯ 1 ⋅ 2 and 1 + 2 ⪯ 1 + 2 (for any , ≥ 0). Moreover, if ⪯ then it can be checked that ( ) ⪯ ( ) for any probability generating function ( ), where we write ( ) to denote the composition ( ( )).
Finally, we remark that if ( ) is a generating function which converges as a function of a complex for < for some non-negative , is called the radius of convergence of . It follows from [15, Theorem 2.19] that lim →∞ = 0 and = ( − ). In addition, if is a probability generating function associated with the random variable then it follows that Pr[ ≥ ] = ( − ).
We de ne = (1 − )∕2 and = 1 − and as in the proof of Bound 1, consider the independent {0, 1}-valued random variables 1 , 2 , … where Pr[ = 1] = . We also de ne the associated {±1}-valued random variables = (−1) 1+ .
Although our actual interest is in the random variable ( ) from (3) on a characteristic string = , we begin by analyzing the case when = 0.
Case 1: when is empty. In this case, the random variable ( ) is identical to ( ) from (2) with = . Our strategy is to study the probability generating function
where = Pr[ is the last time = 0]. Controlling the decay of the coe cients su ces to give a bound on the probability that 1 … is forkable because
It seems challenging to give a closed-form algebraic expression for the generating function ; our approach is to develop a closed-form expression for a probability generating function̂ = ∑ ̂ which stochastically dominates and apply the analytic properties of this closed form to bound the partial sums ∑ ≥ ̂ . Observe that if ⪯̂ then the serieŝ gives rise to an upper bound on the probability that 1 … is forkable as
̂ . The coupled random variables and are Markovian in the sense that values ( , ) for ≥ are entirely determined by ( , ) and the subsequent values +1 , … of the underlying variables . We organize the sequence ( 0 , 0 ), ( 1 , 1 ), … into "epochs" punctuated by those times for which = = 0. With this in mind, we de ne ( ) = ∑ to be the generating function for the rst completion of such an epoch, corresponding to the least > 0 for which = = 0. As we discuss below, ( ) is not a probability generating function, but rather (1) = 1 − . It follows that
Below we develop an analytic expression for a generating function̂ for which ⪯̂ and de nê = ∕(1−̂ ( )). We then proceed as outlined above, noting that ⪯̂ and using the asymptotics of̂ to upper bound the probability that a string is forkable. In preparation for de ninĝ , we set down two elementary generating functions for the "descent" and "ascent" stopping times. Treating the random variables 1 , … as de ning a (negatively) biased random walk, de ne to be the generating function for the descent stopping time of the walk; this is the rst time the random walk, starting at 0, visits −1. The natural recursive formulation of the descent time yields a simple algebraic equation for the descent generating function, ( ) = + ( ) 2 , and from this we may conclude
We likewise consider the generating function ( ) for the ascent stopping time, associated with the rst time the walk, starting at 0, visits 1: we have ( ) = + ( ) 2 and
Note that while is a probability generating function, the generating function is not: according to the classical "gambler's ruin" analysis [6] , the probability that a negatively-biased random walk starting at 0 ever rises to 1 is exactly ∕ ; thus (1) = ∕ . Returning to the generating function above, we note that an epoch can have one of two "shapes": in the rst case, the epoch is given by a walk for which 1 = 1 followed by a descent (so that returns to zero); in the second case, the epoch is given by a walk for which 1 = −1, followed by an ascent (so that returns to zero), followed by the eventual return of to 0. Considering that when > 0 it will return to zero in the future almost surely, it follows that the probability that such a biased random walk will complete an epoch is + ( ∕ ) = 2 = 1 − , as mentioned in the discussion of (9) above. One technical di culty arising in a complete analysis of concerns the second case discussed above: while the distribution of the smallest > 0 for which = 0 is proportional to above, the distribution of the smallest subsequent time for which = 0 depends on the value . More speci cally, the distribution of the return time depends on the value of . Considering that ≤ , however, this conditional distribution (of the return time of to zero conditioned on ) is stochastically dominated by , the time to descend steps. This yields the following generating function̂ which, as described, stochastically dominates :
It remains to establish a bound on the radius of convergence of̂ . Recall that if the radius of convergence of̂ is exp( ) it follows that Pr[ 1 …
is forkable] = (exp(− )). A su cient condition for convergence of ( ) = ∕(1 −̂ ( )) at is that that all generating functions appearing in the de nition of̂ converge at and that the resulting valuê ( ) < 1.
The generating function ( ) (and ( )) converges when the discriminant 1 − 4 2 is positive; equivalently
. Considerinĝ , it remains to determine when the second term, ( ) ( ( )), converges; this is likewise determined by positivity of the discriminant, which is to say that
Equivalently,
Note that when the series ⋅ ( ) converges, it converges to a value less than 1∕2; the same is true of ⋅ ( ). It follows that for = 1 + 3 ∕2 + ( 4 ), ̂ ( ) < 1 and̂ ( ) converges, as desired. We conclude that
Case 2: when is non-empty. The relative margin before begins is ( ). Recalling that ( ) = ( ) and conditioning on the event that ( ) = , let us de ne the random variables {̃ } for = 0, 1, 2, ⋯ as follows: If thẽ random walk makes the th descent at some time < , theñ = 0 and the remainder of the walk is identical to an ( − )-step random walk which we have already analyzed. Hence we investigate the probability generating function The dominance notation above follows because ⪯̂ and ⪯ ∞ . For ( ) to converge, we need to check that ( ) should never converge to 1∕ . One can easily check that the radius of convergence of ( )-which is √ 1 − 2 -is strictly less than 1∕ when > 0. We conclude that ( ) converges if both ( ) and ( ) converge. The radius of convergence of ( ) would be the smaller of the radii of convergence of ( ) and ( ). We already know from the previous analysis that̂ ( ) has the smaller radius of the two; therefore, the bound in (10) applies to the relative margin ( ) for ≥ 0.
The optimal online adversary and the proof of the margin equalities
The adversary discussed in [7] processes a characteristic string in an online setting: she watches each new 1 or 0 appear and makes real-time decisions about which chains to build on and which blocks to release. The analysis in [7] shows that she that will always succeed in building a balanced fork, if one exists for that characteristic string. This result naturally suggests the possibility of a new adversary who maximizes relative margin. A chain split that a ects a large portion of the characteristic string is potentially problematic for the normal functioning of a blockchain, even if the split does not span the full length of the characteristic string.
In this section, we will de ne a new adversary who seeks to maximize ( ). Like the original adversary, she also processes a characteristic string and makes decisions in an online setting. We will prove that this new adversary is able to maximize ( ) for all possible decompositions of a characteristic string into components = .
The optimal online adversary
We again adopt the notation used in [7] , with a few additions: let 1 and 2 be the disjoint tines of for which ( ) = reach( 1 ) and ( ) = reach ( 2 ), and let̂ be the longest tine of . Finally, let represent the set of tines of such that reach( ) = 0. (We will sometimes refer to such tines as critical tines.)
The optimal online adversary has a simple set of rules that govern her decision-making. Suppose the adversary has a current characteristic string and a fork-in-progress, . If the next token of the characteristic string is revealed to be a 1, she makes no changes to . If the next token of the characteristic string is a 0, she looks for tines with reach precisely 0, chooses the tine that branches from 1 earliest in the fork, and extends it by 1 gap( ) 0. If there are no tines with reach exactly 0, she extendŝ . She will always extend minimally, i.e., play no more adversarial blocks than are needed to convince the next honest party to play on her chosen tine.
Proof of optimality
Before we dive into the proof of Lemma 4, we note two results that will be referenced frequently in the main proof. Recall from Section 2 the de nition of inclusion (denoted ⊑) for forks.
De nition 13 (Fork pre xes).
If is a pre x of some string ∈ {0, 1} * , ⊢ , and ⊢ , then is a pre x of if is a consistently labeled subgraph of (i.e., all vertices and edges of also appear in , and the label of any vertex appearing in both and is identical). We denote this relationship by ⊑ .
We are especially interested in forks ⊢ and ⊢ such that is a pre x of and = for ∈ {0, 1}. By considering the possible "extended" forks that can arise from some , we will build intuition for how forks grow and change with each new slot. In particular, in the special case when and are closed forks and = 0, then di ers from by exactly one closed tine, consisting of (0 or more) adversarial vertices and and exactly one honest leaf. We will sometimes call such tines extensions.
We can immediately derive two useful results related to extensions. As in [7] , we use the notation reach □ ( ) (or reserve □ ( ), or gap □ ( ), etc.) to indicate the reach (or reserve, or gap) of the tine in the context of a particular fork. This is usually pertinent when we have two forks , such that ⊑ and we would like to compare the reach of the same tine as it appeared in each fork. Proof. The tine is the "new" tine containing the new honest node. By de nition, reach ( ) = reserve ( ) − gap ( ). Honest players will only place nodes at a depth strictly deeper than all other honest nodes, so we infer that is the longest tine of , and so gap ( ) = 0. Moreover, we observe that there are no 1s occurring later in the characteristic string, and so reserve ( ) = 0. Plugging these values into our de nition of reach we see that reach ( ) = 0 − 0 = 0.
Intuitively, a tine that arises by extension in an honest slot must be the longest tine of the fork, because honest players will only extend a chain with maximum length. Moreover, there are no dishonest slots after the nal honest slot, so the remaining reserve is 0. Therefore, reach is exactly 0.
Claim 2 (Reach of non-extended tines). Consider a closed fork ⊢ and some closed fork ⊢ 0 such that ⊑ . If a tine of did not arise from extension, i.e., it existed in , then reach ( ) < reach ( ).
Proof. De nitionally, we know that reach ( ) = reserve ( ) − gap ( ). From to , the length of the longest tine increases, and the length of does not change, so we observe that gap ( ) > gap ( ). The reserve of does not change, because there are no new 1s in the characteristic string. Therefore, reach ( ) = reserve ( ) − gap ( ) < reserve ( ) − gap ( ) = reach ( ) . Now we are ready to proceed with our proof of Lemma 4. The structure of the proof closely follows the analogous proof for the recursive de nition of margin given in Lemma 4.19 of [7] ; however, as discussed above, it incorporates the de nition and analysis of the new adversary.
Proof of Lemma 4. Let be a fork for the characteristic string . In the base case, where = , we observe that any two tines of are disjoint over . Moreover, even a single tine 1 is disjoint with itself over ! Therefore, the relative margin ( ) must be greater than or equal to the reach of the tine that achieves reach( ) = ( ). The relative margin must also be less than or equal to ( ), because that is, by de nition, the maximum reach over all tines in all forks ⊢ . Putting these facts together, we have ( ) = ( ).
Moving beyond the base case, we will consider a pair of closed forks ⊢ and ⊢ such that ⊑ , , ∈ {0, 1} * , is nonempty, and ∈ {0, 1}.
Suppose the next slot is dishonest. Then must necessarily be equal to , because we are dealing with closed forks and have not introduced any new honest nodes. The reach of each tine increases by 1 from to because the gap has not changed and reserve has increased by one.
If instead, the next slot is honest, there are more possibilities to consider. We will break this part of the proof into several cases based on the relative reach and margin of the fork. In each case, we will prove the lower bound by showing how the adversary can achieve some value of ( ), and then use a proof by contradiction to show that this value is in fact the upper bound.
Case 1: ( ) > 0 and ( ) = 0. Let be some fork for such that ( ) = ( ) and ( ) = ( ). The optimal online adversary will build on some tine with reach( ) = 0, and break ties by choosing to extend the tine that branches from 1 as early as possible. In fact, in this case we are guaranteed that any tine she chooses will diverge from 1 prior to the beginning of : because ( ) = 0, we know that the tine 2 associated with ( ) is disjoint with 1 over and is in the set of critical tines. Based on our description of the optimal online adversary, we know that she will either build on 2 , or on another tine that diverges from 1 even earlier, and is also disjoint with 1 over . This shows that any such extension guarantees ( 0) is at least 0, as the extension and 1 form a pair of tines disjoint over 0.
In order to prove that the relative margin in this case must be exactly 0, we need to show the corresponding upper bound. Let be a closed fork for the characteristic string = 0 such that ( ) = ( 0) and ( ) = ( 0), and let ⊢ be the unique closed fork such that ⊑ . Let 1 and 2 be the tines of that achieve ( 0) and ( 0), respectively. Suppose (toward a contradiction) that ( 0) > 0. Then neither 1 or 2 is an extension because, as we proved in Claim 1, extensions have reach exactly 0. This means that 1 and 2 existed in , and had strictly greater reach in than they do presently in (by Claim 2). Because 1 and 2 have been implicitly assumed to be disjoint over 0, they must also be disjoint over ; therefore the margin of must be at least min{reach ( 1 ), reach ( 2 )}. Following this line of reasoning, we have ( ) ≥ min{reach ( 1 ), reach ( 2 )} > min{reach ( 1 ), reach ( 2 )} = ( 0) > 0.
This contradicts our original assumption for the case, which states that ( ) = 0. We can conclude that ( 0) ≤ 0, as desired.
We will analyze this case with the help of subcases based on the contents of , the set of critical tines. If = { 1 }, our adversary will extend 1 . The extension has reach 0, so ( 0) ≥ 0. Additionally, 2 's reach decreases by 1, and the extension and 2 are still disjoint over , so ( 0) ≥ ( ) − 1. If contains both 1 and 2 , the adversary extends 2 , because it is totally disjoint from 1 over and has reach 0. The extension still has reach 0, so ( 0) ≥ 0. Furthermore, the reach of 1 decreases by 1, and the extension and Next, we want to prove the corresponding upper bound. Suppose ⊢ 0 is a closed fork such that ( 0) = ( ) and ( 0) = ( ), and let ⊢ be the unique closed fork such that ⊑ . De ne 1 , 2 to be a pair of tines disjoint over in such that reach ( 1 ) = ( ) and reach ( 2 ) = ( ) = ( 0). First, it will be helpful to determine some facts about 1 . Speci cally, we claim that 1 must be an extension. Suppose 1 is not an extension. The fact that 1 achieves maximum reach implies that 1 has non-negative reach, because the longest tine always achieves reach 0, so 1 must do at least as well as the longest tine. Furthermore, Claim 2 states that all tines other than the extended tine see their reach decrease. Therefore, if 1 was not extended, then 1 as it appeared in must have had strictly positive reach. This contradicts the central assumption of the case, i.e., that ( ) = 0. Therefore, we conclude that 1 arose from extension.
Having established that 1 must arise from extension, we know that the tine pre x of 1 that is present in must have reach of at least 0 (otherwise it couldn't be extended). Additionally, we have assumed ( ) = 0, so reach ( 2 ) ≤ 0. Together, these statements tell us that reach ( 1 ) = 0. Restricting our view to , we see that 1 (as it appeared in ) and 2 are disjoint over , and so it must be true that min{reach ( 1 ), reach ( 2 )} ≤ ( ). Because reach ( 1 ) = 0 and reach ( 2 ) ≤ ( ) = 0, we can simplify that statement to reach ( 2 ) ≤ ( ). Finally, because 2 was not extended from to , Claim 2 tells us that reach ( 2 ) < reach ( 2 ). Taken together, these two inequalities show that reach ( 2 ) < reach ( 2 ) ≤ ( ). Reach is always an integer, and so reach ( 2 ) < ( ) implies reach ( 2 ) ≤ ( ) − 1, as desired.
Case 3: ( ) > 0, ( ) ≠ 0. Suppose by induction that we have ⊢ and tines 1 , 2 such that ( ) = ( ) = reach ( 1 ) and ( ) = ( ) = reach ( 2 ). Our adversary will minimally extend a tine with reach 0, if one exists, or̂ . As a result of this extension, we know that reach ( ) = reach ( ) − 1. The witnesses 1 and 2 will still be disjoint over 0, so ( 0) ≥ ( ) − 1. Now we need to prove the corresponding upper bound. Let ⊢ 0 be a closed fork such that ( 0) = ( ), and let ⊢ be the unique closed fork such that ⊑ . Additionally, let 1 and 2 be tines disjoint over such that reach ( 1 ) = ( ) and reach ( 2 ) = ( 0). We will break this case into sub-cases. In the rst sub-case, suppose that neither 1 nor 2 arose from extension. Then min{reach ( 1 ), reach ( 2 )} ≤ ( ), because 1 and 2 existed in and must be disjoint over (by virtue of being disjoint over 0). Furthermore, our claim about reach of non-extended tines implies that reach ( ) < reach ( ) for ∈ {1, 2}. Therefore, ( 0) = min{reach ( 1 ), reach ( 2 )} < min{reach ( 1 ), reach ( 2 )} ≤ ( ), as desired. For the second sub-case, suppose either 1 or 2 arose from extension. It must be true that reach ( 2 ) ≤ 0, because either 2 is the extension (and therefore has reach exactly 0) or 1 is the extension and we have reach ( 2 ) = ( 0) ≤ ( 0) = reach ( 1 ) = 0. Recall that we have assumed ( ) ≠ 0. If ( ) > 0, we are done: certainly ( 0) ≤ 0 < ( ). If, however, ( ) < 0, there is more work to do. Suppose ( ) < 0. In this case, it is not possible for 2 to have been the extension. If 2 arose from extension, then it must have had some precursor in with non-negative reach. Additionally, by our claim about non-extended tines, we see that reach ( 1 ) > reach ≥ 0. Therefore, 1 and the precursor to 2 would be a pair of tines that achieve margin greater than or equal to 0. By contradiction, 2 cannot have arisen from extension, so we do not need to worry about this case. The last remaining scenario is the one in which ( ) < 0 and 1 arises from extension. In this scenario, 2 cannot have been the extension (since there is only one!) so we can invoke our claim about reach of non-extended tines once again to see that reach ( 2 ) > reach ( 2 ). Using a now-familiar line of reasoning, note that 2 and 1 (prior to its extension) are a valid choice for a pair of tines achieving margin in , and therefore reach ( 2 ) ≤ ( ). We now have ( ) ≥ reach ( 2 ) > reach ( 2 ) = ( 0). Because reach is always an integer, the value of ( 0) must be less than or equal to ( ) − 1, as desired.
Observe that the lower bounds are actually derived by showing that our new online adversary is able to achieve the that value of ( ) in each case. Because that value actually matches the upper bound, we know that the adversary maximizes ( ).
Perhaps surprisingly, this strategy allows our adversary to maximize relative reach and margin over all possible decompositions = . This is because her strategy is independent of any particular decomposition; she will always build pairs of viable tines that are edge-disjoint over as much of the string as possible, which is the best she can hope to do with respect to any decomposition.
Exact settlement probabilities
Given an ∈ (0, 1] and an , let ℬ( , ) be the binomial distribution with parameter and = (1 − )∕2. The recursive de nition of relative margin provides a polynomial-time algorithm (in and ) for computing, for , ≥ 0 and any > 0, the probability Pr[ ( ) ≥ 0], where = and = . In typical circumstances, however, it is more interesting to establish an explicit upper bound on Pr[ ( ) ≥ 0] where → ∞; this corresponds to the case where the distribution of the initial reach ( ) is the dominant distribution ℛ ∞ discussed in the proofs and (due to dominance) serve as an upper bound for any nite . For this purpose, one can implicitly maintain a sequence of matrices ( ) for = 0, 1, 2, ⋯ , such that 0 ( , ) = ℛ ∞ ( ) for all 0 ≤ ≤ 2 and the invariant ( , ) = Pr Table 1 contains these probabilities where ranges from 0.05 to 0.40 and ranges from 50 to 1000. In addition, the base-10 logarithms of these probabilities appears in Figure 4 . The points corresponding to a xed appear to form a straight line, validating Bound 2 which claims that the probability should decay exponentially in . 
